Engaged Climate Ethics*
Fergus Green, Eric Brandstedt
Abstract
We are in the grip of a climate emergency. Recently, a letter signed by more than 11,000 scientists from 153 countries, published in the journal BioScience, stated frankly that ‘[a]n immense increase of scale in endeavors to conserve our biosphere is needed to avoid untold suffering due to the climate crisis’.1 It is in this profoundly disturbing context, at the dawn of what may perhaps be humanity's most defining decade, that a degree of critical reflection on the role political philosophers can, and should, play in these endeavours seems apt. Over the last three decades, political philosophers/theorists and ethicists2 have attempted to grapple with the myriad conceptual and normative challenges posed by climate change. They have produced a rich and fascinating canon of scholarship that has pushed the boundaries of moral and political theory, bringing formerly marginal questions—about global duties, future persons, non-human species, diffusely caused harms, risk and uncertainty, for example—into the mainstream of philosophical theorizing. Climate change, in short, has done much for philosophy. But philosophy, we suggest, has not done much for climate change. That is, we doubt whether normative theorizing about climate change (hereafter ‘climate ethics’) has done much to positively influence real-world climate action.3 This, at least, is our motivating hunch. Perhaps troubled by this failure, many theoretical interventions in climate ethics over the last decade or so have taken a ‘non-ideal’ turn. In this article, however, we argue that the standard approach to non-ideal climate ethics limits its capacity to have a positive influence on real-world climate action. Rather, we argue that engaged methods4—methods of doing political theory that involve substantial interaction between the theorist and an actual or potential agent of change, or participation by the theorist in such a group agent, where such interaction or participation influences the content of the theorist's normative constructs—are a superior means of achieving that objective. To be clear, we are not suggesting that engaged climate ethics is the only way climate ethics could legitimately be done. We take no issue with using standard methods as a means to achieving progress towards philosophy's truth-seeking objective. However, we believe many of our colleagues pursue climate ethics at least partly because they are concerned about the effects of climate change, and they believe, in a pragmatist vein, that climate ethics can have some influence, however marginal, on social responses to it. Accordingly, this group of philosophers, at least, should be interested in how climate ethics scholarship can best—or at least better—achieve that practical objective. Given the scale and urgency of the climate crisis, we think this is a valuable contribution that normative theorists can make in their capacity as scholars (as distinct from their capacity as concerned citizens); and our purpose here is to spearhead efforts in that direction. The article is structured as follows. In Section I, we briefly outline some recent examples of non-ideal climate ethics. We identify among such examples the common utilization of a principles-first method of non-ideal theorizing. In Section II, we critically evaluate in detail one illustrative example of the principles-first method—a 2014 article in this journal by Simon Caney.5 We discuss two major weaknesses of Caney's method qua means of effectively averting the climate emergency (Caney's self-described goal). In Section III, we argue that engaged methods are well suited to overcoming these weaknesses, offering a more promising path to real-world influence through political theorizing. We discuss three kinds of engaged methods—which we call ethnographic, activist, and committee-based engaged methods—about which there has been much recent discussion, often methodologically reflexive, in political theory more generally. We suggest some promising subjects to which aspiring engaged climate ethicists might apply these engaged methods. In Section IV, we respond to a set of objections that goes to the legitimacy of engaged methods, which might be levelled by proponents of the more standard, principles-first approach. Seminal early contributions to climate ethics applied ideal, often cosmopolitan, principles of justice to develop accounts of climate-related rights and duties.6 Climate change, on these accounts, was seen as a global and intergenerational problem best solved by implementing universal ethical principles. A central question addressed by climate ethicists was how to distribute emission rights between individuals in developed and developing countries, where these individuals were described as having made different contributions and having different capacities to reduce their emissions.7 However, after the failure in Copenhagen dashed expectations of an ambitious global climate treaty, many climate ethicists8 turned away from formulating global principles of climate justice and towards non-ideal theory.9 Political reality seemed unresponsive to issues of equity and justice; it was ‘radically non-ideal’, as Aaron Maltais put it.10 Such non-ideal theorizing typically involved taking widely accepted principles of climate justice and considering how they could be implemented under existing conditions. Consider three examples. Dominic Roser analyses the current climate-political impasse as an injustice that follows from a lack of individual motivation.11 He that individuals should the least the of however may that is, that reduce the agent such as some that there is no to the of principles of climate because they in the in the the of climate change should be by the rich developed and no should be He to these as and with which in with climate A example is the approach by in which principles of climate justice in the of in to which they in to the that these are to these non-ideal is the utilization of what we to as a principles-first method of non-ideal normative method is by a to think through what should be done to the However, the is that this to a theory of which of principles that and rights for a The of theorizing is to the theory of justice through the of philosophical to the or of the normative The of these principles is in as that have a moral these principles are typically and at a of their However, this of is not to justice of their real-world or Rather, it is their and that is to the and social of justice in political such critically and It is the role of non-ideal theory, on this to the principles these rights and in a that is in of about and to be and to to the normative But the of non-ideal theory are at a of that much they are typically to the or in with to no to the role of of and their their or their and is to through the between the theorizing and the of such We that this principles-first method of non-ideal theorizing has capacity to have a positive influence on real-world climate action. To this in the we critically evaluate in detail example of non-ideal climate ethics that this principles-first that of Simon in 2014 article of Climate and We on the method in that article for three is one of the most climate and the article was published in this one of the in the is in that article that the of theoretical of is to effectively the climate which means there can be no doubt that our of using theory to positively influence real-world climate action. is a and of we are the principles-first a with which to the potential for that method to its self-described objective. To be clear, the is on Caney's 2014 article qua of the principles-first method widely by climate not qua of Caney's more It is from these that a principles-first approach to should what in to effectively the climate emergency. with an normative theory or and to an of a of the to with and the of to such that this is the to We that this method to Caney's self-described of averting the climate emergency is, positively real-world we two objections In this we discuss our We argue that Caney's method is to be in averting the climate emergency for from its We this in three Caney's method is of a of at the least, it be with in for it to be applied by actual to actual is the it that a of as to how to influence the in which make these be in the that they are not by the of Caney's normative to the Accordingly, these from normative that the normative by Caney's the and normative individual what to about climate change, the by Caney's method are to have positive influence on real-world climate action. To how Caney's method is of a of the of at which the and the needed to it. The is to the climate emergency by the global The of at which the is as to the of that be to that are often we the is by the of at which these are of to be it could be by individual as the for an of to of this there be many are of that are of some Consider Caney's of by may in that be valuable in one But these be in an that To take Caney's of The for are and many could play in But the by which a agent most effectively to achieving the climate be on on taken by in a for there be many are of of the in that a to its political objective. may have the to the so might of the needed to the be to The of to the of and the of the that achieving the climate a degree of among and of of and so the of at the global for doing the means that most of it at more and have to make that are on and to the of in these that be by with the of climate so to the we not to that is to the for in to a it be for to with the so done to the of the However, one needed in to were to the with a set of it not that this be the best normative method for positively climate suggest some it is to we not think that could be by a set of to the Rather, the about how to the in which make often be Caney's method normative to it the that are to such in a way that the in of normative are at least kinds of that they are to what their The two from the about and under of about the best to the a between how to their to that might different should a in or Given the normative of different to the climate this is a whether to to a doing so may be Perhaps with the to a has a to the in is, not of the is a of the But this is typically be to the and that such the agent having a to a in the is to they are of the most of in of The of this of be a between what done on the of actual and what to done to the climate emergency. this in the of our and of are to the could have their more in of achieving the climate that is, in that make the more to be no one can in how many be needed to make a which to be and so The is such many a about how to their and to different a The many the to make from between and with their a from an to the in to and be of to reduce in these Perhaps take after have the of it seems in the of our no doubt many and as a by by a different can be by to Caney's seems has the of the content of some is needed to the under which and by how that might not of can the of be in the of of is to with their and the and of reflection on the and between these that of on climate change make should of their normative between how much of their and they on climate as to moral and and how much of their and they in on moral the and with such The for in this from normative as to the of as to the of one is to one is of moral Given the and normative agent with to their we question the of Caney's method in positively climate it may to moral which we take no The theory of change in this method is a and some may the article, the of the normative for and to the and normative involved in what they should to change the We not doubt that this could have a on some the by the method its the kinds of most needed to the in which are of of In group not only the and by Caney's method to be made in one way or among individuals may about which to the group is to an of normative that Caney's method the of about the of the the and a such as this may or among the normative to what is at in the normative or to of accepted by the for the of that could be to Caney's method and the as a be to the climate Caney's method a many of the so the under real-world a between the of and the of that most avoid the climate the method on its can be by on an that seems to the of in the with the to in Caney's not only to their to reduce their are to on their that is not to change as a of to their Perhaps we could to are most of with their But what their seems to be a problem of that Caney's method has no way of The problem from the that often lack the to their Caney's method on it can a in to and so to the that are to the the method the in Caney's method can be seen as an of what has as a more common to much non-ideal the of the agent of that the injustice often of the and they can to are among the to a that be through political that political and often this of the or in of that to are or the and group for the most of the in of change, one to of is on an agent to about the change, and it is to think that A agent of change is a potential agent of change is, or might to to pursue change to the We that of change taking of not only to a their what we call their that is, their potential to be so to as to to pursue of and is central to the engaged methods of climate ethics that we in Section A of principles-first methods may respond that is not a for moral for a But this our we are not for an for moral critically the potential for principles-first methods on moral to positively influence real-world climate action. The that the of the is to of and that such an has moral But this goes to the of our with principles-first are to normative it is to how this of theorizing could have much real-world about and In Section IV, we how proponents of engaged methods can respond to the that normative theorizing about of change A way of doing moral or political that substantial interaction between the theorist and some actual or potential of change, or participation by the theorist in a group agent of change, where such interaction or participation influences the content of the theorist's normative (as to the needed to apply normative climate the of engaged methods to positively influence real-world climate action. theoretical by the of to the political of their their and and with to think through the and ethics of their in a and is to the that principles-first theorizing We this through a of three of engaged methods that have been widely applied in of philosophical In the can be as on a between two social at one the of the as at the the the activist, and the The of these of engaged methods we call engaged methods. the theorist or as a for philosophical reflection about and method with the role of the as it a However, as they are interested in normative theorists have a and they and to this the of normative and an means to how individuals as moral and political to the of normative individuals in their social and to the to and for moral and political that they engaged methods of moral and political theorizing have which can conceptual and normative and practical for In this it is that much recent in normative theory has on or and and is typically by a practical to such and for the We potential in such methods to climate ethics. We for in normative by climate ethicists with by and with in and from or of from their and the many effects of such the of or to in the of climate ethicists have to the and such or to their normative and of the of philosophical reflection is that in a can of is that it can to moral In this vein, future could the and in the and This, in might for of political and more to climate we such as subjects of normative reflection is that they are often to and through or political in to climate change. that is to climate with some using their to with and and are a more for a of for and their social social and in Given their potential their to and their often to influence political we suggest that engaged theorizing about the through interaction with and in be a of climate of engaged methods, which we engaged methods, is in the of existing social It can be and from engaged by a and by the theorist with the of the with which they are as an much theorizing is engaged in this much and theory, as well on and proponents of methods, recent of political theory have about A common of such is the of a with a for the theorist between an and a the theorists to a more of the by political in their and social context, and the and that the in a political The theorist's is through with to and of In of such theorizing at and of injustice a of so in our about how best to and in to influence to their and the theorists or with a normative as to and their and to one by conceptual and political The of a for an climate The in the in the early from of harms, such as the of in rights with the a of on the of and their for and The of the in many that to with climate as and through the of such as and the on to a set of in the climate change the to reduce set of has among the of on in and the and in the way that climate such justice have how some in of risk that to be in applied philosophical of have and to to such this and the has a positive on real-world change, in the of major and climate in and In this vein, one we as for climate ethics is A critical of the climate problem that and the of in and the of our and the through which it Such the role of the in of injustice the well the caused by climate change rights and of it the and that and these at we philosophical to the role of with to climate on most normative they are one of among and are for Such a critical in about where to for potential of change, and for that can be done with such of the and caused by social are such as the and at Such are and to take at political and of ethical Accordingly, by with or in such normative theorists can from their normative theorizing by it with from the the theoretical and normative of They can and an existing of the that their theorizing have a real-world on the climate In of the content of such we for theorizing with social to develop and for and of which are central for the of social the and of such as the by the and by the theorists are at and normative Accordingly, they have that make valuable in to develop such normative developed on the of principles of justice are often or to be of to social to of and in a interaction with social can normative theorists to the and by climate to develop normative that have a of climate critical The justice the of theorizing climate change in an from the of to climate change and climate from of and by one has the of on climate change in of their of to and of the by and on this and for to climate change by and with A example one of the many of between climate change and how often on that is to in a and done by and of a that such its and that such a an more and the for political to a only on two examples the of the and potential of theorizing. A and of engaged theorizing committee-based engaged methods. philosophers by of or such as or and in the of has on the political of issues in of of this of and has set the to doing it It be however, that we are here interested in the of philosophers qua engaged philosophers, that is, that of the philosophical role with of social this that of the Accordingly, one of committee-based that not as in our is where a an existing normative theory or to the issue at in to a is not to that philosophers doing committee-based engaged not on the of and their and they The is as we in our of Caney's real-world not only normative that this with as of a the means through which that is and a way is example of that not as engaged on our is where the role is to or existing philosophical and from the philosophical of may be valuable in its it not our of an engaged examples of committee-based engaged methods of which we are Caney's as of the for on ethical issues role that the of has and the of and on the of for the for Climate The for such in the climate are the to the are to the that are and to the philosophers are to there is for philosophers to pursue this on their we not to suggest of future our of of engaged methods. We this by the from engaged theorizing in of overcoming the of principles-first non-ideal methods that we with potential of change theorists with a from which and of political can be with actual or potential of change. this theorists and of change can and grapple with the and normative that is by principles-first non-ideal they can so in a that is more and to they not to the moral of theory or by doing theorizing with early that are because the the and at least the between the and the of is or as is the between the agent of change and the It is that these the in which normative theorists can valuable in the of they can is by the of with which they be in the and by the potential in theorizing on the of social or change. we have that engaged methods have a potential to to real-world change than the standard, principles-first approach to non-ideal theorizing about climate change. We and respond to a set of potential objections to engaged methods, that such methods are or means of real-world change through philosophy. To be clear, we that the our that to influence real-world what they might to call a of engaged methods as means of that objective. We that the objections from an about the way for philosophers to this the principles-first approach that we in Section this is the the is to of engaged methods as or the might that engaged methods to theorizing of to be in the to which they the might that engaged methods to theorizing that moral is so the might because it the to a the practical of normative the with no for and or for motivating to their of least three for to this of objections are The the principles-first approach it to be a means of to real-world is the by and for that justice are and that their is the that from the to the from which the justice what to and are more a more to political change is to with to the and that their and their Such involve and to which the normative theorist should be well to this different to the of the principles-first not the to the principles-first of and moral that method because that such is and that such moral A is more of of the standard the to be to the of non-ideal this with of change is a to this is the for by and think there are of not think that non-ideal theorizing can be to what these are and the to that in of many lack the or to on The for and with and or of their and responses to what to which political is a the political offering to an non-ideal political theorists the that their is a and political and the of by the engaged political theorist are not by of justice and their many of change and take the of injustice not having of justice to A is to the standard perhaps it as one of perhaps in engaged theorizing as and valuable in its this is taken by proponents of engaged methods. to the that might and that there are of and that from argue that these can be through and the they that no is theorizing its of and to the that normative theorizing in critical analyses and that are on the and the and this it as one of valuable philosophical with that are more and The common of these three is that engaged methods are at least a means of to influence change in the of a grip on our with and at least different from of the principles-first approach. They that engaged methods are not to political or involve of and theorizing. and different from the principles-first are at least no article has as to real-world climate is a of climate engaged methods are superior to principles-first methods. non-ideal we has capacity to to such action. We two of the principles-first method through a of an article by Simon which we to be of this We three of engaged methods. We that the substantial interaction or participation of change that engaged methods theorists to the of the principles-first to to real-world climate action. we engaged methods a set of objections that question their legitimacy as means of achieving real-world change political philosophy. We in that some theorists may with engaged or or to it in of current We with these But they not to engaged climate ethics. Rather, our are they in of and existing and the that is to philosophers that should to on our role as potential of such were we have no doubt that many to to principles-first methods of climate ethics. may to make philosophical contributions to the of and in this we But for of to theorizing that contributions to real-world efforts to the climate the has to our