A Remedial Action Scheme To Mitigate Market Power Caused by Cyberattacks Targeting a Smart Distribution System
Ehsan Naderi, Arash Asrari
Abstract
In this article, we scrutinize a false data injection cyberattack, which can cause <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">market power</i> in favor of a group of aggregators participating in a deregulated electricity market. Therefore, an attacker on behalf of a group of retailers gains access and manipulates the data control unit of other retailers. The main objective of the attacker is to compromise the information associated with the (to be attacked) market participants. Such a cyberattack can lead to a <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">market power</i> since the system operator will need to accept <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">any</i> price offered by the nonattacked retailers to prevent the shortage of supply. This article also proposes a remedial action scheme (RAS) to mitigate the consequences of such a cyberattack by running a backup market. The effectiveness of the proposed RAS is validated on the 136-bus distribution system modified to become unbalanced and contain retailers of photovoltaic, wind turbines, smart homes, and diesel engines.