Multicopy and Multiserver Provable Data Possession for Cloud-Based IoT
Jiayan Shen, Peng Zeng, Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo
Abstract
Provable data possession (PDP) is widely considered to be an efficient method in verifying the integrity of remote data. While earlier PDP schemes are generally designed to check the integrity of data copies on a single cloud server (CS), there have been attempts to design multicopy and multiserver PDP (MCMS-PDP) schemes in recent years. However, it is known that MCMS-PDP schemes may be vulnerable to copy-summation attacks or do not support dynamic operations. The former enables a (dishonest) CS to only store a summation of copies for successful verification, while the latter does not allow the data owner to update the stored data. In this article, we propose a new MCMS-PDP scheme based on homomorphic verifiable tags. Specifically, our proposed scheme is designed to check the integrity of all copies in one challenge–response and resist copy-summation attacks. The scheme also supports public verification and block-level dynamic operations, such as modification, insertion, and deletion using the divide-and-conquer table. We then prove the security of our scheme, assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie–Hellman problem, in the random oracle model. We also evaluate the performance of the scheme to demonstrate its efficiency.