Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking and Disturbance Rejection for High-Order Integrators Over Jointly Strongly Connected Switching Networks
Xiongnan He, Jie Huang
Abstract
In this article, we study the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking of N -player games with high-order integrator agents over jointly strongly connected networks. The same problem was studied recently over static, undirected, and connected networks. Since a jointly strongly connected network can be directed and disconnected at every time instant, our result strictly includes the existing results as special cases. Moreover, in addition to some analytic conditions on the payoff functions, the existing results also rely on the satisfaction of an inequality involving some Lipschitz constant and the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of the Laplacian of the network graph. By adopting a different approach, our result does not rely on the satisfaction of this inequality. Furthermore, our result can also be extended to the case where the additive disturbances are imposed on the input of each agent. Our design is illustrated by two numerical examples.