A PUF-based Lightweight Authenticated Metering Data Collection Scheme with Privacy Protection in Smart Grid
Yanan Cao, Yujue Wang, Yong Ding, Haibin Zheng, Zhenyu Guan, Huiyong Wang
Abstract
The rapid development of information and communication technology has made great advancements to grid structure, but at the same time it has also brought new security and privacy challenges to smart grid. Metering data transmitted in insecure public networks are vulnerable to eavesdropping and tampering by other organizations or users. Also, smart meters exposed to the outside could be physically attacked. Many privacy-preserving authentication schemes in smart grid have been proposed in recent years. However, most of them cannot protect smart meters from physical attacks. In this paper, a new lightweight privacy-preserving authenticated data collection scheme (PAC) based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is proposed. With the uniqueness property of PUFs, the proposed scheme can not only resist physical attacks, but also support key sharing and identity authentication. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme can guarantee the privacy of users and resist traditional attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and physical attacks. Experimental performance indicates that the proposed scheme has high efficiency and low interaction.