WHEN BI-INTERPRETABILITY IMPLIES SYNONYMY
Harvey Friedman, Albert Visser
Abstract
Abstract Two salient notions of sameness of theories are synonymy , aka definitional equivalence , and bi-interpretability . Of these two definitional equivalence is the strictest notion. In which cases can we infer synonymy from bi-interpretability? We study this question for the case of sequential theories. Our result is as follows. Suppose that two sequential theories are bi-interpretable and that the interpretations involved in the bi-interpretation are one-dimensional and identity preserving. Then, the theories are synonymous. The crucial ingredient of our proof is a version of the Schröder–Bernstein theorem under very weak conditions. We think this last result has some independent interest. We provide an example to show that this result is optimal. There are two finitely axiomatized sequential theories that are bi-interpretable but not synonymous, where precisely one of the interpretations involved in the bi-interpretation is not identity preserving.