A Reconnaissance Penetration Game With Territorial-Constrained Defender
Li Liang, Fang Deng, Jianan Wang, Maobin Lu, Jie Chen
Abstract
A reconnaissance penetration game is a classic target-attacker-defender game. In this game, a reconnaissance UAV (namely attacker) tries to avoid the defender and reconnoiter a target as close as possible, whereas a target tries to escape the attacker with the help of defender. Practically, the defender is considered constrained in a certain territory to capture the attacker and help the target. This article is primarily concerned with the winning region for three players. An explicit policy method is proposed to construct the barrier analytically. In addition, taking practical payoff functions into account, a complete solution to the reconnaissance game is provided by fusing the games of kind and degree. Simulation results are elaborated to showcase the effectiveness of the proposed policy.