Voting Schemes in DAO Governance
Qinxu Ding, Weibiao Xu, Zhiguo Wang, David Kuo Chuen Lee
Abstract
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the different voting schemes used in DAO governance. We will examine the various features of these schemes and compare their differences. We propose a new hypothetical voting mechanism specifically designed for decentralized and permissionless DAO governance. This new scheme, which incorporates incentive designs, is intended to be more efficient than existing schemes and can be easily adapted to a permissioned scenario. Through this examination and proposal, we hope to contribute to the ongoing discourse on how to govern decentralized autonomous organizations effectively.
Topics & Concepts
VotingCorporate governanceIncentiveScheme (mathematics)Computer scienceMechanism (biology)Risk analysis (engineering)Weighted votingProcess managementBusinessPolitical scienceMicroeconomicsEconomicsMathematicsEpistemologyLawFinancePoliticsPhilosophyMathematical analysisBlockchain Technology Applications and SecurityAuction Theory and ApplicationsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting