The integration of sensations and mental experiences into a unified experience: A neuropsychological model for the “sense of self”
Brick Johnstone, Daniel Cohen, Andrew Dennison
Abstract
A continued weakness in the cognitive neurosciences is the lack of a model to explain the phenomenological experience of the "self." This article proposes a model that suggests that the right hemisphere association area integrates physical sensations and mental experiences into a unified experience (i.e., a "sense of self") that is best conceptualized and understood as the subjective experience of "mineness." This model presents a unifying framework for neurologic and psychiatric disorders of the self (i.e., dis-integrated sense of "mineness"), as well as a neuropsychological framework to explain several human characteristics and experiences. Research is reviewed that indicates the sense of self can be activated to serve as the neuropsychological foundation of "self-integrated" character traits such as empathy (i.e., experiencing other's thoughts/emotions as "mine"), and conversely, the inhibition of this integrative process which can serve as the foundation of "selfless" experiences such as transcendence and forgiveness. Future research and clinical applications are discussed.