Resilient Economic Control for Distributed Microgrids Under False Data Injection Attacks
Wenhao Zhang, Tong Qian, Xingyu Chen, Kecan Huang, Wenhu Tang, Qinghua Wu
Abstract
With the rapid applications of communication technology, the hierarchical control of microgrids is threatened by unprecedented cyber attacks and faults. Current researches seldom study the impact on the control of cyber failures and their defense strategies. In this research, an economic control method modified from the traditional droop control is proposed. It requires distributed generators (DGs) to exchange corresponding information through a communication network, which may face potential risks of false data injection attacks (FDIAs). To tackle it, an attack-resilient method (ARM), modified from the weighted mean subsequence reduced (WMSR) algorithm, is proposed. It is proved that the successful attack-resistance and convergence performance require the communication topology to satisfy ( <b xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">r</b> +1)-robust, using the graph theory. By employing the TrueTime2.0 toolbox of MATLAB/Simulink, simulations of two microgrid test systems are performed. Results verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method on economic control under FDIAs.