Everywhere All at Once: Co-Location Attacks on Public Cloud FaaS
Zirui Neil Zhao, Adam Morrison, Christopher W. Fletcher, Josep Torrellas
Abstract
Microarchitectural side-channel attacks exploit shared hardware resources, posing significant threats to modern systems. A pivotal step in these attacks is achieving physical host co-location between attacker and victim. This step is especially challenging in public cloud environments due to the widespread adoption of the virtual private cloud (VPC) and the ever-growing size of the data centers. Furthermore, the shift towards Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) environments, characterized by dynamic function instance placements and limited control for attackers, compounds this challenge.
Topics & Concepts
ExploitCloud computingComputer scienceComputer securitySide channel attackHost (biology)Function (biology)Service (business)Operating systemCryptographyBusinessMarketingEvolutionary biologyEcologyBiologySecurity and Verification in ComputingAdvanced Memory and Neural ComputingPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security