Quantum Mechanics and the Consciousness Constraint
Philip Goff
Abstract
Abstract This chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding relationship, this chapter bolsters the challenge faced by wave function monism in accounting for ordinary physical objects, before arguing that its failure to account for ordinary physical objects entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.
Topics & Concepts
MonismConsciousnessMaterialismEpistemologyQualiaDe Broglie–Bohm theoryPhysicalismOntologyFunction (biology)Theoretical physicsMetaphysicsPhilosophyQuantumPhysicsQuantum mechanicsEvolutionary biologyBiologyQuantum Mechanics and ApplicationsPhilosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy and Theoretical Science