Measuring Systemic Risk of Switching Attacks Based on Cybersecurity Technologies in Substations
Koji Yamashita, Chee‐Wooi Ten, Yeonwoo Rho, Lingfeng Wang, Wei Wei, Andrew Ginter
Abstract
This paper describes the derivation of steady-state probabilities of the power communication infrastructure based on today's cybersecurity technologies. The elaboration of steady-state probabilities is established on (i) modified models developed such as password models, (ii) new models on digital relays representing the authentication mechanism, and (iii) models for honeypots/honeynet within a substation network. A generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) is utilized to formulate the detailed statuses and transitions of components embedded in a cyber-net. Comprehensive steady-state probabilities are quantitatively and qualitatively performed. The methodologies on how transition <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">probabilities</i> and <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">rates</i> are extracted from the network components and a conclusion of actuarial applications is discussed.