The Person-Based Intuition and the Better Chance Puzzle
M. A. Roberts
Abstract
Abstract This chapter explores the tensions that arise among three claims regarding the value of existence that seem, on close inspection, highly plausible. The first is (a) that the additional worth-having existence (other things being equal) is not a moral plus; the additional worth-having existence doesn’t (other things being equal) make an outcome, or possible world or possible future morally better. It’s true that (a) seems rooted in what is called the person-affecting intuition, and that intuition has been roundly criticized on grounds of inconsistency and, independently, the Non-Identity Problem. Both objections, however, can be avoided if accept a second claim: (b) that the additional worth-having existence can make a future, not just not morally better, but also morally worse. The third claim is simply (c) that a person’s having a better chance of coming into existence can itself be a moral plus. It can, for example, easily convert a choice that would otherwise be morally wrong into a choice that is morally permissible. But now we are in a bind. For how can (c) a better chance of existence make things morally better when (a) the fact of the worth-having existence doesn’t make things better? Moreover, how can (c) a better chance of existence make things morally better when (b) the fact of the worth-having existence can make things morally worse? The aim of this chapter is to reconcile (c) against both (a) and (b).