Cybersecurity Attacks on Software Logic and Error Handling Within ADS-B Implementations: Systematic Testing of Resilience and Countermeasures
Syed Khandker, Hannu Turtiainen, Andrei Costin, Timo Hämäläinen
Abstract
Automatic-dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a cornerstone of the next-generation digital sky and is now mandated in several countries. However, there have been many reports of serious security vulnerabilities in the ADS-B architecture. In this article, we demonstrate and evaluate the impact of multiple cyberattacks on ADS-B via remote radio frequency links that affected various network, processing, and display subsystems used within the ADS-B ecosystem. Overall we implemented and tested 12 cyberattacks on ADS-B in a controlled environment, out of which 5 attacks were presented or implemented for the first time. For all these attacks, we developed a unique testbed that consists of 36 tested configurations. Each of the attacks was successful on various subsets of the tested configurations. In some attacks, we discovered wide qualitative variations and discrepancies in how particular configurations react to and treat ADS-B inputs that contain errors or contradicting flight information, with the main culprit almost always being the software implementation. In some other attacks, we managed to cause denial of service by remotely crashing/impacting more than 50% of the test set that corresponded to those attacks. We also implemented, and report some practical countermeasures to these attacks. We demonstrated that the strong relationship between the received signal strength and the distance-to-emitter might help verify the aircraft.s advertised ADS-B position and distance. For example, our best machine learning models achieved 90% accuracy in detecting attackers' spoofed ADS-B signals.