VR-Spy: A Side-Channel Attack on Virtual Key-Logging in VR Headsets
Abdullah Al Arafat, Zhishan Guo, Amro Awad
Abstract
In Virtual Reality (VR), users typically interact with the virtual world using virtual keyboard to insert keywords, surfing the webpages, or typing passwords to access online accounts. Hence, it becomes imperative to understand the security of virtual keystrokes. In this paper, we present VR-Spy, a virtual keystrokes recognition method using channel state information (CSI) of WiFi signals. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses WiFi signals to recognize virtual keystrokes in VR headsets. The key idea behind VR -Spy is that the side-channel information of fine-granular hand movements associated with each virtual keystroke has a unique gesture pattern in the CSI waveforms. Our novel pattern extraction algorithm leverages signal processing techniques to extract the patterns from the variations of CSI. We implement VR-Spy using two Commercially Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices, a transmitter (WAVLINK router), and a receiver (Intel NUC with an IWL 5300 NIC). Finally, VR-Spy achieves a virtual keystrokes recognition accuracy of 69.75% in comparison to techniques that assume very advanced adversary models with vision and motion sensors near the victim.