Physical Layer Security against an Informed Eavesdropper in Underwater Acoustic Channels: Feature Extraction and Quantization
Konstantinos Pelekanakis, Seckin Anil Yildirim, Georgios Sklivanitis, Roberto Petroccia, João Alves, Dimitris A. Pados
Abstract
During the Rapid Environmental Picture 2018 (REP18) sea trial, two underwater acoustic nodes (Alice and Bob) exchanged 897 channel probes over different ranges and environmental conditions. In this short paper, Alice and Bob independently process their received probes offline with the aim to generate a cryptographic key based on Physical Layer Security (PLS). Using their estimated Channel Impulse Responses (CIRs), they compute and quantize four pre-agreed channel features. Eve is a simulated eavesdropper who is aware of the PLS algorithm, the 3D positions of Alice and Bob and the acoustic properties of the environment. Eve uses the de facto standard Bellhop acoustic simulator to predict the bi-directional CIRs between Alice and Bob and compute her own quantized features. We calculate the Bit Disagreement Ratio (BDR), which is a function of the number of disagreeing bits between a pair of nodes. Our results confirm that the proposed features are robust enough to yield a lower BDR between Alice and Bob than that for Eve. The BDR impact on reconciliation and secret key generation is studied in a subsequent paper [1].