Voting governance and value creation in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs)
Cristiano Bellavitis, Paul P. Momtaz
Abstract
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) crowdfunds to invest in various projects. The decentralization feature of DAOs submits that decision-making is a collective democratic action of all DAO members. The autonomy feature of DAOs suggests that decision-making is an algorithmic process governed by self-executing smart contracts. However, in reality, DAOs are neither perfectly decentralized nor completely autonomous. Our empirical analysis shows that deviations from the ideals of decentralization and autonomy are costly. Non-algorithmic off-chain voting governance of decision-making leads to a substantial discount in DAO value. Non-decentralized aspects such as large voting coalitions also affect DAO value. Interaction effects are also shown. The study implies that platform governance design choices are crucial for DAO success. • DAOs with off-chain voting raise 87% less funding. • Larger communities worsen the valuation hit from off-chain voting. • Big voting coalitions deepen off-chain governance drawbacks. • On-chain transparency is key to DAO success—especially in large technical teams.