A dynamic game modeling on air pollution mitigation with regional cooperation and noncooperation
Tingru Yang, Hua Liao, Yunfei Du
Abstract
Mitigating regional air pollution involves multifaceted trade-offs, including long-term versus short-term development versus emission-reduction among different regions. Considering the heterogeneity of levels of regional economic development and capacity for environmental governance as well as the spatial spillover effect of pollution, the game theory method can explore each region's dynamic emission-reduction path. In this article, the dynamic game mechanism (Regional Environment Economy Game Modeling model) is incorporated into the environment economy system to solve the Nash equilibrium under dynamic conditions and explore the game strategies of each region. Taking air pollution mitigation in North China as an example, this article compares the emission-reduction effect and social welfare under regional cooperative and noncooperative game scenarios and clarifies the abatement-sharing mechanism between provinces. The results show that a noncooperative policy is strictly inferior to a cooperative policy for achieving given emission-reduction goals and maximizing social welfare. Our findings offer evidence for strengthening regional cooperation in reducing carbon emissions and provide policy recommendations for synergistic pollution abatement and joint regional pollution mitigation. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2023;19:1555-1569. © 2023 SETAC.