Dynamic GPS Spoofing Attack Detection, Localization, and Measurement Correction Exploiting PMU and SCADA
Sara Siamak, Maryam Dehghani, Mohsen Mohammadi
Abstract
GPS receiver is the source of synchronization in phasor measurement unit (PMU) networks. While it guarantees time precision, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks, which may modify the time offset and results in mismatches in time. This modification (GPS spoofing attack) changes the phase angle of signals measured by PMU. This article deals with three important challenges in GPS spoofing attack detection; first, multiattack detection while there are probable attacks on different PMUs, second, attack detection considering the dynamic model of power systems, and third, measurement correction. For providing solution to the abovementioned problems, an anti-GPS spoofing attack mechanism is suggested, in which, a dynamic filter with the help of PMU and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems measurements estimate the phase shifts caused by spoofing attacks. The results of data fusion of PMUs and SCADA in the detection method are shown. Numerical results demonstrate that this approach can detect dynamic spoofing attacks in a reasonable time and as soon as multiple attacks are detected, corrected measurements are provided.