Formal Verification and Analysis of Primary Authentication based on 5G-AKA Protocol
Ed Kamya Kiyemba Edris, Mahdi Aiash, Jonathan Loo
Abstract
Fifth generation mobile network (5G) is intended to solve future constraints for accessing network services. The user and network operator depend on security assurances provided by the Authentication and Key Agreement protocols (AKA) used. For 5G network, the AKA has been standardized and 5GAKA protocol is one of the primary authentication methods that have been defined. This paper models the protocol and provides comprehensive formal analysis on 5G-AKA protocol as specified by The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard. Using ProVerif a security protocol verification tool, we perform a full systematic evaluation of the 5G-AKA protocol based on the latest 5G specifications. We present security assumptions and properties that assists on the analysis based on two taxonomies, we find out that some important security properties are not achieved, and related work ignored some crucial protocol flaws. Finally, we make some recommendations to address the issues found by our security analysis.