Peer-to-Peer Coupled Trading of Energy and Carbon Emission Allowance: A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Approach
Haotian Yao, Yue Xiang, Chenghong Gu, Junyong Liu
Abstract
Existing decoupled energy and carbon trading market leads to an inefficient and suboptimal operation of the distribution networks regarding economic interests and emission reduction. Corresponding to these issues, this paper designs a novel peer-to-peer (P2P) trading market of both energy and carbon emission allowance (CEA). It factors the value of transactive CEA into prosumers’ energy trading and leads to a cost-efficient decarbonization. The P2P coupled trading market is modelled as a risk-averse stochastic Stackelberg game to account for the competitive relationships between prosumers. Moreover, the approach enables prosumers to deal with risks in profits due to uncertainties from solar, load, and upstream price according to their different subjective perception of risks. Rather than directly enforcing prosumers to behave carbon-efficiently and grid-friendly, we impose a carbon-aware network charge to incentivize prosumer to adopt trading strategies that are optimal for both prosumers and the network. We illustrate that the proposed decentralized market-clearing algorithm yields a unique Stackelberg equilibrium without disclosing sensitive information of prosumers concerning operation costs and emission pattern. Results demonstrate that the proposed coupled market outperforms the traditional decoupled market in self-interest, social welfare, and emission reduction.