A Carbon Emission Allowance Bargaining Model for Energy Transactions Among Prosumers
Yue Xiang, Guiping Qing, Mengqiu Fang, Zhengmao Li, Haotian Yao, Junyong Liu, Zekun Guo, Jichun Liu, Pingliang Zeng
Abstract
The carbon pricing is the main issue of the carbon trading market for enabling cost-effective decarbonization in the energy networks. A nodal carbon pricing model is firstly proposed based on the sharing and integration of the intra-regional carbon emission allowance. In this regard, the game theory is introduced to construct a multi-agent carbon emission allowance bargaining model in this letter. The alternating direction multiplier method is adopted to solve the model considering the competitional burden and privacy-preserving. Numerical results demonstrate that it could significantly reduce the carbon emissions of regional energy networks and improve the economic benefits of prosumers.