Further Analysis and Improvements of a Lattice-Based Anonymous PAKE Scheme
Ruoyu Ding, Cheng Chi, Yue Qin
Abstract
To improve the security of mobile networks in the postquantum era, Dabra <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> recently proposed a lattice-based anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (LBA-PAKE) protocol for mobile devices. Especially, LBA-PAKE is claimed to support the key reuse. However, we find that LBA-PAKE is still vulnerable to the signal leakage attack when the master key is reused. We propose two strategies to reduce the needed number of queries in our attack. Compared to the method of Bindel <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> , our method reduces the required queries by more than 75%. Our experiments show that breaking LBA-PAKE needs less than 2 min. Through analysis of why LBA-PAKE fails in their security proof, we further propose an improved protocol without incurring extra computation costs. The formal security analysis shows that our improved scheme supports all features of LBA-PAKE while thwarting the signal leakage attack. Moreover, the implementation of our improved protocol demonstrates its efficiency in mobile networks.