Nihil Obstat: Lewis’s Compatibilist Account of Abilities
Helen Beebee, Maria Svedberg, Ann Whittle
Abstract
Abstract In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and a general discussion of the account’s main features.
Topics & Concepts
CompatibilismPhilosophyObstacleEpistemologyContext (archaeology)Section (typography)Philosophy of mindContemporary philosophyFree willAnalytic philosophyMetaphysicsComputer scienceHistoryLawPolitical scienceOperating systemArchaeologyFree Will and AgencyPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryPhilosophy and Theoretical Science