Detection of global positioning system spoofing attack on unmanned aerial vehicle system
Liang Chen, Meixia Miao, Jianfeng Ma, Hongyang Yan, Qun Zhang, Xinghua Li
Abstract
Summary Most of the existing global positioning system (GPS) spoofing detection schemes are vulnerable to the generative GPS spoofing attack, or require additional auxiliary equipment and extensive signal processing capabilities, leading to defects such as low real‐time performance and large communication overhead which are not available for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, also known as drone) system. Therefore, we propose a novel solution which employs information fusion based on the GPS receiver and inertial measurement unit. We use a real‐time model of tracking and calculating to derive the current position of the drones which are then contrasted with the position information received by the receiver to verify whether the presence or absence of spoofing attack. Subsequent experimental work shows that, the proposed method can accurately detect the spoof within 8 seconds, with a detection rate (DR) of 98.6%. Compared with the existing schemes, the performance of real‐time detecting is improved while the DR is ensured. Even in our worst‐case, we detect the spoof within 28 seconds after the UAV system starts its mission.