Stackelberg Security Game for Optimizing Cybersecurity Decisions in Cloud Computing
Abdelkarim Ait Temghart, Mbarek Marwan, Mohamed Baslam
Abstract
As it is difficult to cover all cybersecurity threats, an optimal defense strategy is one of the focal issues in cloud computing due to its dynamic abstraction and scalability. On this basis, Stackelberg security games (SSG) have received significant attention for their better deployment of limited security. To deal with uncertainty and incomplete information, we introduce a modified quantal response (Mod-QR) approach that incorporates bounded rationality and preference into the decision-making process. Formally, this can be done by using the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) framework to find a trade-off between the effectiveness and operating costs of cloud computing. In this case, the most effective countermeasures to defend the cloud can be viewed as a mixed strategy in which all the actions of the defender are played with a nonzero probability. This framework has been evaluated using an experimental study on MATLAB optimization toolbox to understand the behavioral aspects of cybersecurity actors and then to proactively protect cloud computing.