Post Quantum Cryptography Analysis of TLS Tunneling on a Constrained Device
Jon Barton, William J. Buchanan, Nikolaos Pitropakis, Sarwar Sayeed, Will Abramson
Abstract
Advances in quantum computing make Shor’s algorithm for factorising numbers ever more tractable. This threatens the security of any cryptographic system which often relies on the difficulty of factorisation. It also threatens methods based on discrete logarithms, such as with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. For a cryptographic system to remain secure against a quantum adversary, we need to build methods based on a hard mathematical problem, which are not susceptible to Shor’s algorithm and create Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC). While high-powered computing devices may be able to run these new methods, we need to investigate how well these methods run on limited powered devices. This paper outlines an evaluation framework for PQC within constrained devices, and contributes to the area by providing benchmarks of the front-running algorithms on a popular single-board low-power device. It also introduces a set of five notions which can be considered to determine the robustness of particular algorithms.