Higher-order theories do just fine
Matthias Michel, Hakwan Lau
Abstract
Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument'. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.
Topics & Concepts
Argument (complex analysis)Electromagnetic theories of consciousnessFocus (optics)PsychologyConsciousnessOrder (exchange)PerceptionSet (abstract data type)EpistemologyCognitive psychologyCognitive sciencePhilosophyComputer scienceBiochemistryPhysicsProgramming languageFinanceOpticsChemistryEconomicsNeural dynamics and brain functionFace Recognition and PerceptionCognitive Science and Education Research