Algebraic Cryptanalysis of O'zDSt 1105:2009 Encryption Algorithm
Bakhtiyor Abdurakhimov, Zarif Khudoykulov, Allanov Orif, Boykuziev Ilkhom
Abstract
In this paper, we examine algebraic attacks on the O'zDSt 1105:2009. We begin with a brief review of the meaning of algebraic cryptanalysis, followed by an algebraic cryptanalysis of O'zDSt 1105:2009. Primarily O'zDSt 1105:2009 encryption algorithm is decomposed and each transformation in it is algebraic described separately. Then input and output of each transformation are expressed with other transformation, encryption key, plaintext and cipher text. Created equations, unknowns on it and degree of unknowns are analyzed, and then overall result is given. Based on experimental results, it is impossible to save all system of equations that describes all transformations in O'zDSt 1105:2009 standard. Because, this task requires 2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">73</sup> bytes for the second round. For this reason, it is advisable to evaluate the parameters of the system of algebraic equations, representing the O'zDSt 1105:2009 standard, theoretically.