SHADOW: Preventing Row Hammer in DRAM with Intra-Subarray Row Shuffling
Minbok Wi, Jaehyun Park, Seoyoung Ko, Michael Jaemin Kim, Nam Sung Kim, Eojin Lee, Jung Ho Ahn
Abstract
As Row Hammer (RH) attacks have been a critical threat to computer systems, numerous hardware-based (HWbased) RH mitigation strategies have been proposed. However, the advent of non-adjacent RH attacks and lower RH thresholds significantly increase the area and performance overhead of these prior solutions due to their conservative design characteristics.We propose a new in-DRAM RH protection solution named Shuffling Aggressor DRAM Rows (SHADOW). SHADOW dynamically randomizes DRAM row mapping information, preventing an attacker from targeting a specific victim row that may hold critical data. SHADOW is robust against non-adjacent RH attacks because it utilizes the in-DRAM row-shuffle technique. To realize the in-DRAM row-shuffle operation with low performance and energy overhead, we use a novel DRAM microarchitecture optimization technique. We also utilize the recently introduced JEDEC RFM interface to enable in-DRAM RH mitigation without any DRAM interface changes. By exploiting an additional DRAM row per subarray, SHADOW does not require costly SRAM- or CAM-based tracking structures other than intrinsic counters for the RFM interface. We demonstrate the strong probabilistic protection of SHADOW against RH attacks through adversarial pattern analysis and highlight the compelling performance, area, and energy overheads compared to those of state-of-the-art HW-based RH prevention solutions.