Contrast or Continuum?
Amy Kind
Abstract
Abstract Though traditional folk psychology treats imagination and belief as distinct kinds of mental states, recently a number of philosophers have suggested that this is mistaken (e.g., Schellenberg 2013; Egan 2008; Currie and Jureidini 2004). According to what’s often referred to as the continuum hypothesis, imagination and belief are best thought of as lying on a continuum, with at least some of the intermediary states along this continuum best thought of as imagination-belief hybrids. In support of the continuum hypothesis its defenders often argue that certain phenomena such as delusions and imaginative immersion can be best (or, perhaps, only) explained if we reject the view that there is a sharp division between imagination and belief. In this chapter, the author reviews the case for the continuum hypothesis and suggests that it is not as strong as its defenders would have us believe.