Eavesdropping a (Ultra-)High-Definition Video Display from an 80 Meter Distance Under Realistic Circumstances
Pieterjan De Meulemeester, Bart Scheers, Guy A. E. Vandenbosch
Abstract
In this paper a method is presented which successfully reconstructs the video image of a video display unit (VDU) by exploiting its leakage emissions at a distance of 80 meters. The video image reconstruction is realized without any prior knowledge of the leaking VDU and by using commercial off-the-shelf material. The tested VDUs comprise of an UHD (ultra-high-definition) video display and a full HD (high-definition) video display, both employing an HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) cable as a video data signaling interface linked to a notebook. The tested setups are located in an urban environment with sporadic radio emissions and occupied frequency bands. Subsequently, the methods and results are thoroughly discussed which give new insights into this video eavesdropping risk for improving video data security.