Threatening Quality of Will
D. H. Shoemaker
Abstract
Abstract Quality of Will ( qw ) theories of responsibility claim the target of someone’s blameworthiness for an action is their poor quality of will. There have been many “threats” to such a theory over the years, coming out of a literature interested in the metaphysical conditions of free will, threats having to do with moral luck, manipulation, and negligence. In this paper, I am more interested in surveying and thwarting two “new school” threats to qw theories, including taking responsibility for inadvertence, and holding reasonable but ostensibly wrongful beliefs. Both of these aim to ground blameworthiness independently of quality of will. I show that none of these new school threats to qw theories succeed.
Topics & Concepts
LuckAction (physics)Quality (philosophy)Law and economicsMetaphysicsEpistemologyMoral responsibilitySociologyLawPolitical sciencePhilosophyPhysicsQuantum mechanicsFree Will and AgencyWar, Ethics, and JustificationPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment