A Game-Theoretic Approach for Non-Cooperative Load Balancing Among Competing Cloudlets
Sourav Mondal, Goutam Das, Elaine Wong
Abstract
To deliver high performance and reliability to the mobile users in accessing mobile cloud services, the major interest is currently given to the integration of centralized cloud computing and distributed edge computing infrastructures. In such a heterogeneous network ecosystem, multiple cloudlets from different service providers coexist. However, to meet the stringent latency requirements of computation-intensive and mission-critical applications, overloaded cloudlets can offload some of the incoming job requests to their relatively under-loaded neighboring cloudlets. In this paper, we propose a novel economic and non-cooperative game-theoretic model for load balancing among competitive cloudlets. This model aims to maximize the utilities of all the competing cloudlets while meeting the end-to-end latency of the users. We characterize the problem as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem and investigate the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We design a variational inequality based algorithm to compute the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that all the competing cloudlets are able to maximize their utilities by employing our proposed Nash equilibrium computation offload strategy in both under- and overloaded conditions. We also show through numerical evaluations that our load balancing model outperforms some of the existing game-theoretic load balancing frameworks, especially in a highly overloaded condition.