Reasons, Competition, and Latitude
Justin Snedegar
Abstract
The overall moral status of an option—whether it is <italic>required, permissible, forbidden</italic>, or something we really <italic>should</italic> do—is explained by competition between the contributory reasons bearing on that option and the alternatives. A familiar challenge for accounts of this competition is to explain the existence of <italic>latitude</italic>: there are usually multiple permissible options, rather than a single required option. One strategy is to appeal to distinctions between reasons that compete in different ways. Philosophers have introduced various kinds of <italic>non-requiring</italic> reasons that do not generate requirements, even if they win the competition. This chapter rejects two familiar versions of this strategy, one appealing to <italic>merely justifying</italic> reasons and one appealing to <italic>merely commendatory</italic> reasons. It offers a new account of how reasons compete that instead appeals to a sharp distinction between the reasons <italic>against</italic> an option and the reasons <italic>for</italic> the alternatives to that option.