Adaptive Experiential Theory of Hypnosis
Cameron T. Alldredge, Gary Elkins
Abstract
State and nonstate theories of hypnosis have dominated the field for decades and helped advance hypnosis clinically and scientifically. However, they fall short in various ways including insufficient consideration of unconscious/experiential processes. The authors' new theory is predicated on Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory, a dual-process model that provides a comprehensive understanding of the rational system and the experiential system and highlights that, although they interact synergistically, their features and modes of operation differ greatly. The rational system, influenced by logic and reason, is demanding of cognitive resources and operates effortfully with minimal affect. In contrast, the experiential system is emotionally driven, associative, and encodes reality in images and feelings without conscious effort. Our theory, the adaptive experiential theory, posits that complex hypnotic responding is attributable to an individual's ability to adapt and deliberately shift from processing primarily within the rational system to the experiential system. Greater association with the experiential system yields alterations in processing reality, which allows hypnotic suggestions to be internalized and enacted without excessive interference from the rational system.