ACED-IT: Assuring Confidential Electronic Design Against Insider Threats in a Zero-Trust Environment
Andrew Stern, Huanyu Wang, Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor
Abstract
The electronics supply chain has adapted into a global process over the past two decades to support the cost of process optimization. As the semiconductor industry has transitioned from a vertical to the horizontal business model, the perceived vulnerability of integrated circuit (IC) design, and fabrication has grown dramatically. Design intellectual property (IP) is the defining characteristic of most fabless design houses and integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) within the supply chain, and as such, holds significant value for market competitiveness, and in some cases, national security. Malicious insiders threaten the confidentiality of this proprietary technology. To prevent IP piracy, we redefine the modern threat landscape by considering nearly every individual in the IC design and fabrication process untrusted. Therefore, we propose a novel framework to assure confidential electronic design against insider threats, termed ACED-IT, that enables maintaining the confidentiality of the design when it traverses through different design stages (e.g., RTL/Gate-level to GDSII). ACED-IT integrates encryption, logic locking, novel temporary-inserted logic elements (TILEs), access controls, and action logging, to protect the design IP from insider threats originating from any entity in the process. ACED-IT is compatible with the current industry development flow and provides all engineers with the tools to complete their roles. The proposed ACED-IT framework is demonstrated across various benchmarks and analyzed for security. Benchmarks processed using ACED-IT incurred negligible overhead across parameters such as power, area, timing, and test coverage after functional recovery, and provided a brute force attack complexity to recover the original design exceeding that of AES-256.