Decoupling-Based Resilient Control of Vehicular Platoons Under Injection of False Wireless Data
Kang Yang, Di Liu, Simone Baldi, Wenwu Yu, Chen Lv
Abstract
Due to the use of inter-vehicle wireless communication, vehicular platooning can be prone to attacks with corrupted data, as in false data injection (FDI) attacks. It is crucial to develop platooning protocols promoting resilience to injected false data. In this work we show that resilience can be attained by making use of a system-theoretic property known as disturbance decoupling. We first show how disturbance decoupling is obtained in nominal platooning protocols without attacks: then, in the presence of FDI attacks, we propose compensation strategies that guarantee to recover the nominal performance of the platoon. The proposed compensation strategies can cope with platoons of heterogeneous vehicles and are designed towards string stability. Numerical experiments, also performed in a SUMO-Veins co-simulation environment with different platooning scenarios under FDI attacks, validate the effectiveness of the proposed protocols in handling cyber-attacks and platoon heterogeneity.