Stabilizing Energy Communities Through Energy Pricing or PV Expansion
Andreas Fleischhacker, Carlo Corinaldesi, Georg Lettner, Hans Auer, Audun Botterud
Abstract
Energy communities enable members to create jointly value by investing in and operating distributed energy resources (DERs), including generation and storage. In this paper, we develop value allocation and stabilization algorithms for energy communities based on cooperative game theory. The method considers realistic relationships between the consumers of energy within an energy community and potential outside investors, who can form coalitions, while accounting for investment and operation of DERs. We apply the model to a numerical example using data from the Austrian electricity market. The results show how the created value from DERs could be shared between the members of the energy community. Moreover, limited area for solar photovoltaic (PV) installations may destabilize the energy community by removing incentives to participate. Still, the introduction of capacity based payments or the expansion of the limited PV resources show an stabilization effect of the energy community.