Receding Horizon Games with Coupling Constraints for Demand-Side Management
Sophie Hall, Giuseppe Belgioioso, Dominic Liao‐McPherson, Florian Dörfler
Abstract
Distributed energy storage and flexible loads are essential tools for ensuring stable and robust operation of the power grid in spite of the challenges arising from the integration of volatile renewable energy generation and increasing peak loads due to widespread electrification. This paper proposes a demand-side management policy to coordinate self-interested energy prosumers based on Receding Horizon Games, i.e., a closed-loop receding-horizon implementation of game-theoretic day-ahead planning. Practical stability and recursive constraint satisfaction of the proposed feedback control policy is proven under symmetric pricing assumptions using tools from game theory and economic model predictive control. Our numerical studies show that the proposed approach is superior to standard open-loop day-head implementations in terms of peak-shaving, disturbance rejection, and control performance.