Collaborative optimization of hydrogen energy systems: A game-theoretic integration of production, usage and refueling in cross-sectoral scenarios
Xuerui Wang, Ke Li, Guangshuo Liu, Haiyang Wang, Bo Sun, Chenghui Zhang
Abstract
Hydrogen energy is widely recognized as a key component of future energy and transportation systems, offering a viable solution to global carbon emissions and the energy crisis. However, the development of the hydrogen energy chain(HEC) remains sluggish, with its various sectors operating in isolation and lacking integration. The fundamental challenge lies in the absence of a well-established hydrogen market. A game-theoretic framework for structuring a novel hydrogen market is introduced in this research, with an emphasis on hydrogen refueling for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles(HFCVs) as a representative HEC scenario. A cooperative game coalition first is established among grey, blue, and green hydrogen production plants(HPPs) to integrate these three production methods within a unified framework. Carbon quota allocation mechanism is employed to incentivize alliance formation among HPPs. Second, a two-level Stackelberg game is established to model the interactions between HPPs, hydrogen refueling station(HRS), and HFCVs. The Stackelberg game model enhances overall hydrogen production efficiency and sectoral profitability by enabling HFCVs to dynamically respond to refueling pricing. According to experimental results, the cooperative game alliance lowers the production cost for HPPs by at least 14.36 %. The Stackelberg game increases HRS earnings by 16 %, decreases HFCV refueling expenses by 12.8 %, and further reduces manufacturing costs by an additional 10.3 %. Moreover, the establishment of a structured hydrogen energy market is facilitated by the incorporation of a coordinated government-market process. The proposed coordinated optimization framework offers a practical solution to facilitate the development of the hydrogen economy and the establishment of its market.