Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Forward and Backward Private Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Lei Xu, Leqian Zheng, Chengzhi Xu, Xingliang Yuan, Cong Wang
Abstract
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables a server to efficiently search and update over encrypted files. To minimize the leakage during updates, a security notion named forward and backward privacy is expected for newly proposed DSSE schemes. Those schemes are generally constructed in a way to break the linkability across search and update queries to a given keyword. However, it remains underexplored whether forward and backward private DSSE is resilient against practical leakage-abuse attacks (LAAs), where an attacker attempts to recover query keywords from the leakage passively collected during queries.
Topics & Concepts
Computer scienceInformation leakageExploitEncryptionPrivate information retrievalComputer securityLeakage (economics)CryptographySymmetric-key algorithmTheoretical computer scienceContext (archaeology)Computer networkPublic-key cryptographyMacroeconomicsPaleontologyEconomicsBiologyCryptography and Data SecurityPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting