Reinforcement Learning-Based False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids
Liang Xiao, Haoyu Chen, Shiyu Xu, Zefang Lv, Chuxuan Wang, Yilin Xiao
Abstract
False data injection (FDI) attacks construct attack vectors to inject false data into tampered meters with the goal of falsifying state estimation, but resulting in low successful attack rate with high attack costs in terms of the number of tampered meters in large-scale smart grids, because the bad data detection at the control center chooses the dynamic detection thresholds to identify the modified meter measurements. In this article, we propose a reinforcement learning-based FDI attack scheme that optimizes both the tampered meters and the false data to enhance the success attack rate and injected errors while reducing attack costs. Based on meter measurements and previous performance, the attack vector is constructed to induce more errors in state estimation and bypass bad data detection. The performance bounds regarding the successful attack rate and the injected error are derived in terms of the number of bus phase angles, the susceptance of the transmission line, and the maximum false data based on the Nash equilibrium of the FDI game. Simulations performed on both the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems demonstrate the performance gain over the benchmarks.