Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow
Joshua D. Greene
Abstract
De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.
Topics & Concepts
Dual (grammatical number)Dual process theory (moral psychology)Process (computing)CognitionMoral dilemmaEpistemologyPsychologyCognitive psychologyCognitive scienceDual roleDual purposeSocial psychologyComputer sciencePhilosophyNeuroscienceLinguisticsCombinatorial chemistryOperating systemChemistryMechanical engineeringEngineeringPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationEmotions and Moral Behavior