MTD, Where Art Thou? A Systematic Review of Moving Target Defense Techniques for IoT
Renzo E. Navas, Frédéric Cuppens, Nora Cuppens, Laurent Toutain, Georgios Z. Papadopoulos
Abstract
Context: Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems are increasingly deployed in the real world, but their security lags behind the state of the art of non-IoT systems. Moving target defense (MTD) is a cyberdefense paradigm, successfully implemented in conventional systems, that could improve IoT security. Objective: Identify and synthesize existing MTD techniques for IoT and validate the feasibility of MTD as a cybersecurity paradigm suitable for IoT systems. Method: We use a systematic literature review method to search and analyze existing MTD for IoT techniques up to July 2020. We evaluated the existing techniques in terms of security foundations and real-world deployability using the evidence they provide. We define and use entropy-related metrics to categorize them. This is the first MTD survey to use Shannon's entropy metric empirically. Results: Thirty-two distinct MTD for IoT techniques exist: 54% are Network-layer-based, 50% present strong evidence about their real-world deployment, and 64% have weak security foundations. Conclusion: MTD for IoT is a feasible cyberdefense approach. A variety of proposals exist, with evidence about their implementation and evaluation. Nevertheless, the MTD for IoT state of the art is still immature: the security foundations of most existing proposals are weak. Novel techniques should prioritize providing convincing security foundations and real-world deployment evidence.