Blockchain-driven operation strategy of financial supply chain under uncertain environment
Huida Zhao, Jiaguo Liu, Guoqing Zhang
Abstract
The emergence of blockchain creates a new possibility to solve the fraudulent problem of financial supply chain. We construct a game model to verify the strategic choice of the financial supply chain in an uncertain environment. We derive the equilibrium results and investigate the strategic choice of blockchain service for the financial supply chain. We also study the product price, product quantity, financing interest rate, and supply chain risk transmission, respectively. Specifically, when the blockchain is not considered, the financial model of supply chain led by core enterprises depends on firms’ reputation. The retail and wholesale prices increase when fraud occurs or consideration payment increases. Besides, the market stability reduces price performance. In the blockchain environment, the strategic choices are divided into two cases: when choosing the core enterprise model and the third-party service model, the third-party service model is the equilibrium strategy; when choosing the third-party service model and the platform model, the platform model is the equilibrium strategy.