A PQC and QKD Hybridization for Quantum-Secure Communications
Dominik Marchsreiter, Johanna Sepúlveda
Abstract
Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms on which current secure communications rely on. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum key distribution (QKD) are two security technologies that show protection capabilities against the latent quantum threat. While PQC relies on different hard mathematical problems to develop a wide variety of cryptographic operations, QKD is based on quantum physics laws to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys through different QKD protocols. These keys can be used by different applications to perform security transformations. QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The hybridization of PQC and QKD is an important step for future secure infrastructures, being able to provide long-term security. In this work we propose authenticated QKD approaches that rely on pre-shared keys and hybrid PQC/QKD alternatives and which are able to securely exchange secret QKD keys through authenticated channels. We identify the different configuration alternatives and their parameters, as well as we develop a wide performance evaluation. Results show that pre-shared keys and PQC-based authentication through Dilithium algorithm are the fastest alternatives. Also, we show the potential of the T12 QKD protocol.