Blockchain implementation decisions in a dual-channel supply chain under different market power structures
Mingli Yuan, Ruozhen Qiu, Minghe Sun, Songshi Shao, Zhi‐Ping Fan, Henry Xu
Abstract
The increasing concerns over product safety and adulteration risks have heightened the need for traceability and transparency in supply chains. Blockchain technology provides a potential solution, but its adoption involves costs and strategic decisions about information disclosure. This study investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer under four blockchain technology adoption scenarios and two market power structures, where the supplier uses a price-matching policy in the online channel. Stackelberg game models are formulated, and backward induction is used to derive equilibrium decisions on retail price, wholesale price, and amount of blockchain-linked information. The supplier and retailer equilibrium decisions and profits are analyzed and compared across different blockchain technology adoption scenarios and market power structures. Numerical analyses are used to verify the main theoretical results and examine the influences of the parameter values on the equilibrium results. The findings reveal the supplier’s strong incentive to adopt blockchain technology and the retailer’s decision complexity influenced by factors such as consumer shopping convenience, consumer preferences, and retailer competitive position. Additionally, the findings underscore the supplier profitability potential through the traditional retail channel and the value of the price-matching policy to optimise profits for both the supply chain members.