Two Problems for a Truth-Centered Ontology
Peter van Inwagen
Abstract
Abstract According to lightweight platonism, propositions are things that can be said (full stop), attributes are things that can be said of things, and proper relations are things that can be said of pluralities of things. And thus, for a property to be a property of a certain thing (for it to belong to, be had by, be instantiated by, be exemplified by that thing) is for it to be a thing that can be said truly of that thing. Similarly, for a proper relation to hold among certain things is for it to be a thing that can be said truly of those things. Lightweight platonism is therefore a “truth-centered” ontology. Truth-centered ontologies face at least two serious problems. One is how to accommodate set theory (rightly regarded as indispensable in logic and mathematics). The other is the problem of how to treat binary relations that are not symmetrical. (Is the relation ‘north of’ true or false of Edinburgh and London when it is true that Edinburgh is north of London and false that London is north of Edinburgh?) Solutions to these problems are tentatively presented.